If you want to cite any of these papers, you can download everything you need here.


Conditional Collapse. Mind. Forthcoming. [link]

Getting Accurate about Knowledge. Mind. Forthcoming. [link]
Degrees of Assertability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2022. [link]

Vagueness and Discourse Dynamics. Linguistics Meets Philosophy. CUP. 2022. [link]

A Suppositional Theory of Conditionals. Mind. 2021. [link]

The Dynamics of Loose Talk. Noûs. 2021. [link]
Force and Choice. Linguistics & Philosophy. 2021. [link]

The Normality of Error. w/ Simon Goldstein. Philosophical Studies. 2021. [link]

Higher Order Ignorance inside the Margins. Philosophical Studies. 2019. [link]



'Now' with Subordinate Clauses. (w/ Daniel Altshuler). 2017. SALT 27. 358-376. [link]

Loose Talk, Negation and Commutativity: A Hybrid Static-Dynamic Theory. 2017. Sinn Und Bedeutung: 21. [link]

Probability Judgements about Indicative Conditionals. 2016. Logic Journal of the IGPL. 24. 600-611. [link]


[Under review] (with John Hawthorne)

We pose (and propose a solution to) a new kind of puzzle about dogmatism which threatens to impose unreasonable limitations on inquiry.

[Under review]

I defend a novel theory of vagueness, which resolves traditional puzzles to do with tolerance and indeterminacy by giving up the transitivity of entailment.

[Under review]
I show how to reconcile tension between a simple picture of communication and the observation that might-claims sometimes lead to information loss.


Normality (with John Hawthorne)
We argue that the logic of normality is a non-normal modal logic. Specifically, we offer counter-examples to the principle of agglomeration.

Weak Knowledge
I argue that knowledge is compatible with having arbitrarily low credence (above zero).