Force and Choice. Linguistics & Philosophy. Forthcoming. [link]

The Normality of Error. w/ Simon Goldstein. Philosophical Studies. Forthcoming. [link]

Degrees of Assertability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Forthcoming. [link]

A Suppositional Theory of Conditionals. Mind. Forthcoming. [link]

The Dynamics of Loose Talk. Noûs. Forthcoming. [link]

Vagueness and Discourse Dynamics. Linguistics Meets Philosophy. CUP. Forthcoming [link]

Higher Order Ignorance inside the Margins. Philosophical Studies. 2019. [link]


'Now' with Subordinate Clauses. (w/ Daniel Altshuler). 2017. SALT 27. 358-376. [link]


Loose Talk, Negation and Commutativity: A Hybrid Static-Dynamic Theory. 2017. Sinn Und Bedeutung: 21. [link]

Probability Judgements about Indicative Conditionals. 2016. Logic Journal of the IGPL. 24. 600-611. [link]



Modal Revision

Synopsis: I lay out some desiderata for a theory of how epistemic modals change information, and show that neither dynamic nor propositional theories can satisfy all of them. I then develop a conservative generalization of AGM revision for information semantics which does. 


[Title redacted for blind review]

Synopsis: I argue that three appealing principles relating indicative and subjunctive conditionals together imply that indicatives and subjunctives are equivalent. I suggest that this is not as bad as it might seem.