If you want to cite any of these papers, you can download everything you need here.


Conditional Collapse. Mind. Forthcoming. [link]

Getting Accurate about Knowledge. Mind. Forthcoming. [link]
A Suppositional Theory of Conditionals. Mind. Forthcoming. [link]

Degrees of Assertability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2022. [link]

Vagueness and Discourse Dynamics. Linguistics Meets Philosophy. CUP. 2022. [link]

Force and Choice. Linguistics & Philosophy. 2021. [link]

The Dynamics of Loose Talk. Noûs. 2021. [link]

The Normality of Error. w/ Simon Goldstein. Philosophical Studies. 2021. [link]

Higher Order Ignorance inside the Margins. Philosophical Studies. 2019. [link]



'Now' with Subordinate Clauses. (w/ Daniel Altshuler). 2017. SALT 27. 358-376. [link]

Loose Talk, Negation and Commutativity: A Hybrid Static-Dynamic Theory. 2017. Sinn Und Bedeutung: 21. [link]

Probability Judgements about Indicative Conditionals. 2016. Logic Journal of the IGPL. 24. 600-611. [link]


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Synopsis: I look at how epistemic modals change agents' information and argue neither propositional nor dynamic theories do a good job of explaining this. I propose a conservative generalization of AGM revision which does better.

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Synopsis: I defend a theory of vagueness and communication. The theory resolves traditional puzzles to do with tolerance and indeterminacy by giving up the transitivity of entailment. I argue this is good.